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Richard C. Feiock 
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This paper reevaluates Rosenbaum and Kammerer '.s framework of con-
solidation as revolutionary change. We examine their model as 
app li ed to nine consolidation attempts in the U.S . and 
Can ada , with special emphasis on the 19 73 and 1992 
cons olidation efforts in Tallahassee , Florida . Our exami-
nati on of the nine consolidation attempts by referenda 
conf irm Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's thesis , but also sug -
gests the importance of professional campaigns for and 
agai ns t consolidation and the role of elites as "consoli -
dati on entrepreneurs ." 
Any major overhauling of local government structure 
in a particular metropolitan area is likely to involve 
damage to some existing interests . ... Those adversely 
affected can often enlist support from others who 
merely fear the uncertainty of change, or who in-
stinctively prefer known evils to unknown possible 
problems.. .. [A]ny particular reorganization plan 
must compete for favor with not only the status quo 
but also with possible alternative kinds of change. 
(National Commission on Urban Problems 1968, 
335) . 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Society for Public Administration, Orlando Florida, April 1999. We would like to thank 
Russell Hellein of Florida State, Jered Carr of The College of Charleston , the editor of 
this jou rnal, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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Consolidation of city and county governments is a radical, even revolutionary change in local governance (Rosen-baum and Kammerer 1974). A successful consolidation 
outcome is also a rare event with only nineteen consolidation 
successes since World War II (Feiock and Carr 1999). Vincent 
Marando (1979, 411) noted that between 1959 and 1976 only 11 
of the 68 consolidation referenda attempts were successful, a 
success rate of only 25%. Walter Rosenbaum and Gladys Kam-
merer (1974) concluded the probability of success in consolida-
tion through a local referendum was so small that success was 
"against long odds." Their model of successful consolidation is 
essentially a theory of the conditions necessary for revolutionary 
change. 
This article reevaluates Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's 
framework and finds considerable merit in the original theory of 
consolidation as revolutionary change. In the following sections, 
we present an overview of government reorganization and a re-
view of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model. We then critically 
evaluate an application of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model 
to nine consolidation attempts in the U.S. and Canada and dis-
cuss the implications of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model 
for consolidation efforts in Tallahassee, Florida, in 1973 and 
1992. Our examinations of nine consolidation attempts by refer-
enda, including the two in Tallahassee, confirm Rosenbaum and 
Kammerer's thesis, but also suggest the importance of profes-
sional campaigns for and against consolidation and the role of 
elites as "consolidation entrepreneurs." In conclusion, we discuss 
the implications of our analysis for the practice and study of 
government reorganization. 
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DEMAND FOR CHANGE IN 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
In 1963, Roscoe Martin noted that the concept of the 
"city" was changing and pronounced the dawning of a new age 
of the "metropolis ." Not only had metropolitan areas increased in 
size, but the number and complexity of urban problems had in-
creased . 
One means local governments use to adapt to the 
changing needs of the citizens is through change in governance 
structures. The desire of local citizens for change extends from 
"criti cal problems arising from the frustrations of city life and 
the failure of city governments to cope with many of the ele-
mentary problems of everyday living" (Bish and Ostrom 1973, 
3). These problems affect all the citizens of the local area: gar-
bage removal , crime , education , transportation , adequate water 
and sewage , and police and fire protection. Bish and Ostrom 
contend that demands for institutional change can be manifesta-
tions of citizens ' perceptions that· they are paying too much for 
the services they are receiving . 
City-county consolidation is the structural device advo-
cated by the National Commission on Urban Problems as a 
means to decrease the problem of small , overlapping, and dupli-
cating local governments (NCUP 1968). According to the NCUP, 
fragmentation has negative consequences for local government 
because (1) small governmental units cannot provide effective or 
economical solutions to community problems ; (2) overlapping 
governmental layers create waste and confusion for citizens ; (3) 
popular control of local government is ineffective because of 
complex ballots and multiple layers of governance ; (4) leader-
ship in policy making is ineffective or absent ; (5) administrative 
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agencies are archaic and inadequate to the "functional demands 
placed upon them"; and (6) local governments are not able to 
attract or retain professional , highly qualified personnel (NCUP 
1968, 326). 
Reformers may seek the radical change that reorganiza-
tion of local governance will bring , but citizens may be hesitant 
to embrace radical reorganization because they identify with the 
local area through the existing public institutions and their asso-
ciated symbols (Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974). On the other 
hand, Marando (1979) argues that though few consolidation at-
tempts have been successful , the process of attempted reform can 
have positive side effects: 
Consolidation of city and county by referendum is a 
form of reorganization which potentially can affect a 
wide range of governance and service delivery issues . 
In one grand gesture a great deal can be accom-
plished: charter reform, modernization, reduction of 
elected positions to simplify the ballot, the weaken-
ing of localized special interests through the dissolu-
tion of their local governments or special districts , 
county home rule , citizen civic education, a more or-
derly administrative structure , a mobilized civic asso-
ciation , and direct assessment of citizens ' will 
through referendum (Marando 1979, 410) . 
THE ROSENBAUM AND KAMMERER MODEL 
Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) focus on radical 
"comprehensive consolidation " of city and county governments 
through a local referendum. They postulate that radical change 
occurs through revolution following the pattern described by 
scholars of political revolution , particularly Chalmers Johnson's 
1966 book Revolutionary Change. 
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Rosenbaum and Kammerer explore the configuration of 
attributes present in the local community that lead to a successful 
consolidation campaign. They conclude that" . .. successful con-
solidation is imbedded in a number of important social , eco-
nomic, and political transformations in a community and this 
chain of events is essential to the campaign 's success" (Rosen-
baum and Kammerer 1974, 21). Their framework proceeds in a 
"complex set of events" or stages with the outcome as a consoli-
dation referendum . Stage I is classified as "Crisis Climate ," 
Stage II as "Power Deflation," and Stage III as "The Accelerator 
Event." 
Stage I: Crisis Climate . Stage I begins the process with 
a crisis climate , an onset of one or more civic problems (Rosen-
baum and Kammerer 1974, 21) . Rosenbaum and Kammerer de-
scri be the crisis climate as proceeding in three phases: 
(1) environmental changing events , (2) demands from citizens 
for governmental response, and (3) an inappropriate response by 
the government (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 21-24). Envi-
ronmental changing events can include changes in population , 
racial and economic composition , services , appearance, or re-
sources of core cities compared with fringe areas. The important 
point is that citizens are aware that there are problems the local 
government must address. 
These changes can trigger demand for response from the 
government that becomes phase two. For example, in response to 
population changes the demand could be for annexation, better 
transportation , or increased taxing of fringe areas. In the case of 
shifts in racial composition, the demand could be for reappor-
tionment of voting districts. The third phase , a crisis climate , 
occurs when government does not respond to citizens ' demands 
or citizens deem the governmental response inadequate. Rosen -
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baum and Kammerer (1974) note three reasons for the inappro-
priate governmental response: 
1. Intransigence: governmental failure to act with a 
positive response or failure to recognize citizen de-
mands as legitimate; 
2. Conservatism: governmental response is viewed as 
too little, too late by the citizens; 
3. Impotence: governmental response may be handi-
capped by actions that are beyond its control, such as 
defeat in a vote for action that could alleviate the 
problem, i.e., defeat of a bond issue (Rosenbaum and 
Kammerer 1974, 24). 
The important factor in Stage One is that governmental 
responses are chronically and publicly not appropriate to the citi-
zens' increasing demands (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 24). 
During phase one, the government can respond with action to 
ameliorate the public demands. Action such as an innovative 
policy or conservative reform could defuse the crisis climate. 
However, if the governmental response is deemed by the citi-
zenry as not appropriate to the situation, then the crisis continues 
and culminates in a complete Stage I Crisis Climate. 
Stage II: Power Deflation . Power deflation is an in-
creasing loss of confidence in the legitimacy of local govern-
mental structure by the community. The loss of confidence is 
more than just the perception that there is a deficiency in serv-
ices, it is a belief that there is a severe, deep-seated problem in 
the governing structure: the " ... philosophical and structural 
foundations of local government, the fundamentals of the system 
itself ... " (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 25). Rosenbaum and 
Kammerer stress the importance of two broad groups of actors at 
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the power deflation stage, civic elites and the mass media. These 
groups work through public disclosure of government failure and 
promote consolidation as the design that will make the govern-
ment more responsive . The civic elites are an important institu-
tional force for change in the local community. In some cases, 
Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974, 27) see the civic elites ' use of 
local government restructuring as a means to diminish the power 
of other influentials in the community, increase their activity in 
the community, or become the "new guard" that ousts the "old 
guard." 
Community political leaders are an important part of the 
community elite leadership. Sharon Krefetz and Alan Sharaf 
(1977) suggest that the role of the political elites in consolidation 
is critical to the outcome. Business elites may see economic gain 
attached to administrative and political reform (Knott and Miller, 
1987). Feiock and Carr (1999) have linked the presence of aca-
demic elites to entrepreneurship for city/county consolidation . 
They argue entrpreneurial activities of public administration 
scholars can provide the impetus for moving governmental re-
form or reorganization to the forefront of the public agenda 
(Feiock and Carr, 1999). 
The mass media is also important to the power deflation 
stage since the media can shape citizens ' perceptions of local 
government issues . Local radio, television , and newspapers not 
only inform the public but also can shape public opinion: 
... the greatest potential weight of media influence 
can obviously be generated when the media adopt a 
deliberate editorial policy toward existing govern-
mental structures or proposals for their modifica-
tion . . . a power deflation might well be participated, 
or powerfully accelerated , if important community-
media commit themselves to governmental reform 
(Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 27). 
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Power deflation is manifested in several forms, including 
the advent of ad hoc reform groups, elite demands for investiga-
tions of local officials and agencies, media criticism of the local 
government, citizen or community group lawsuits against local 
government personnel or agencies, or formation of local gov-
ernment reorganization study commissions. 
Stage ill: The Accelerator Event. Rosenbaum and 
Kammerer set the third and final stage for radical change with an 
acceleration event. The accelerator event is a means by which 
public support for consolidation is aggregated at the polls. An 
event or events must throw the community into a "critical situa-
tion." The event could begin during the campaign for consolida-
tion. They suggest four types of events that could act as 
accelerators, events that may or may not be directly associated 
with the consolidation effort: 
1. a significant scandal involving a public official or 
agency; 
2 . an emergency in the community that accentuates 
the failure of the present form of government ; 
3. an important criticism of the government from a 
distinguished outside source ; 
4. the sudden loss of an influential leader who 1s 
closely associated with the present form of govern-
ment (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 29) . 
THE MESSINGER MODEL 
Boyd Messinger (1989) was the first to operationalize 
Rosenbaum and Kammerer's framework for consolidation. 
Based on case studies, he identified configurations of the pres-
ence or absence of each stage in consolidation using a template 
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array. Eight cities and nine consolidation attempts were ana-
lyzed: Jacksonville/Duval County, Florida ; Tampa/Hillsborough 
County, Florida ; Nashville/Davidson County, Tennessee (two 
attempts) ; Miami/Dade County, Florida ; Metropolitan Toronto. 
Canada; Indianapolis/Marion County, Indiana; and Virginia 
Beach/Princess Anne County, Virginia . Messinger began with an 
in-depth historical account of the area and the events that led to 
each attempt. He placed each site in the template if it exhibited at 
least one criterion posited by Rosenbaum and Kammerer. Mess-
inger 's analysis of these consolidation attempts is discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
Jacksonville and Tampa. Rosenbaum and Kammerer 
provide case studies of the Jacksonville and Tampa consolidation 
attem pts . Both areas experienced all of the environ-
mental/ physical and demographic changes postulated to create a 
crisis climate . The difference between the two cities was the re-
sponse of the government and the ensuing call for change in the 
community . Jacksonville 's government showed an incompetence 
( or refusal) to handle the problems of race, schools , property as-
sessments , infrastructure , water, and drainage plus the inability 
to annex fringe areas. Tampa, on the other hand, was able to an-
nex the fringe areas, appeared to have a more flexible govern-
ment, was able to raise the revenue for education and 
infrastructure through raising the property assessments , and had 
a more competitive and representative political system . The con-
solidation initiatives in Jacksonville and Tampa also differed . 
Community leaders and the Chamber of Commerce were the 
initiators of reform proposals when the school system lost its 
accreditation (a power deflator) , while in Tampa the legislative 
delegation took the initiative to form a study commission with-
out formal prompting from community leaders (Rosenbaum and 
Kammerer 1974, 47-48) . 
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Power deflation was an important factor in the percep-
tions of government failure. In Jacksonville , the consolidation 
fed on perceptions of deflated government power that were not 
sustained in Tampa. While Rosenbaum and Kammerer contend 
that Tampa exhibited one characteristic of power deflation , the 
creation of a consolidation study commission , Messinger dis-
agrees and interprets the formation of the study commission as 
lacking the element of power deflation because the commission 
was not created in response to a crisis climate. 
Nashville/Davidson County. Nashville/Davidson Cotmty's 
first consolidation attempt was not successful. The crisis climate 
of inadequate services , social/economic inequities , lack of politi-
cal representation , and unstructured growth was compounded by 
the unresponsiveness of the local government (Messinger 1989). 
A study commission was created , but there was no accelerator 
event. Messinger also notes the lack of a professionally run pro-
consolidation campaign. However , a strong anti-merger cam-
paign produced a failed consolidation effort. The second con-
solidation attempt saw an increase in the crisis problem and the 
needed accelerators. A professionally run pro-consolidation 
campaign proved enough to turn the tide . 
Miami/Dade County. The Miami/Dade merger resulted 
in a federation instead of a complete consolidation. Long-
standing suspicions of corruption in the police force , inadequate 
service , corporate criticism , and a political scandal at the county 
level provided accelerators (Messinger 1989, 155-160) . Civic 
organizations such as the League of Women Voters and business 
interests like the Chamber of Commerce united in support for 
merger. 
Virginia Beach/Princess Anne County. Messinger also 
considered the consolidation of Virginia Beach/Princess Anne 
County. The Virginia consolidation is unique because there was 
no crisis climate caused by the performance of the city (Mess-
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inger 1989). Instead , an outside force produced the crisis. The 
State of Virginia allowed cities to annex territory through court 
proceedings rather than a referendum by citizens. The City of 
Norfolk began annexing several square miles in Princess Anne 
County and the City of Virginia Beach felt it needed to protect 
this area and provide a means for its own future growth. The re-
sponse of the local government was impotence (Messinger 
1989). It was unable to stop the City of Norfolk. According to 
Mess inger, the Virginia Beach case provides another expansion 
of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model: crisis may be external 
rather than internal. 
Indianapolis/Marion County and Toronto, Canada. 
Messinger attempted to apply the Rosenbaum and Kammerer 
theory to explain consolidations imposed or mandated from the 
state, rather than the referendum-based consolidation for which 
the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model was intended . While 
Messinger includes in his study the Indianapolis/Marion County 
and the Toronto consolidations , they are omitted from our analy-
sis because they were not referendum mergers , but legislative 
events. 
Messinger 's final template is reproduced in Table 1. 
Messinger found three patterns of consolidation that fit the cases 
he examined: (1) Reform without Referendum , (2) Failed Re-
form Attempts with Referendum , and (3) Successful Reform 
with Referendum. Messinger 's case analysis suggested the need 
to add a Professional Consolidation Campaign Stage (Stage IV) 
to the basic Rosenbaum and Kammerer model. He found that 
successful referendum attempts had included a professional 
campaign waged for consolidation. Campaign veterans and/or 
public relations people staffed these campaigns. They also relied 
on voter attitude surveys , recruited commitments from 
civic/community elites or organizations , and they were well en-
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Location 
Indianapolis 
Toronto 
Tampa 
Nashville (1st) 
JOHNSON AND FEIOCK 
Crisis 
Climate 
Stage I 
TABLE 1 
Messinger's Model 
Power 
Deflator Accelerator 
Stage II Stage III 
1 I 2 I 3 
Reform Without Referendum 
X X X X 
X X X X 
Failed Reform with Referendum 
X * 
X X X X 
Merge? 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
Successful Reform with Referendum 
Nashville (2nd) X X X X X 
Jacksonville X X X X X 
Miami X X X X * 
Lexington X X X X X 
Virginia Be2ch X X X X X 
Notes: X = presence of the event or stage . 
• = Even or stage present only if theory modified . 
- = event or stage absent. 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Theory 
Predict 
Outcome? 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
<lowed with resources or they were targeted to popular support or 
"grass-roots" members of the community (Messinger 1989). 
Messinger suggested that "alienation," should be added 
to phase 3: an inappropriate response of government. He found 
that, sometimes, not only were the governmental responses not 
present, too conservative, or weakened by other governmental 
action, as Rosenbaum and Kammerer postulated, in some cases 
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the responses alienated the citizens from the government (Mess-
inger 1989, 35). 
While Messinger provides a useful descriptive account 
of the patterns identified by Rosenbaum and Kammerer, his work 
does not provide a formal analysis of their model of a successful 
consolidation through referendum. Messinger modified the Ro-
senbaum and Kammerer 's theory to incorporate less revolution-
ary, legislatively imposed change. We address this limitation 
with in-depth case analyses of consolidation efforts in Tallahas-
see, Florida, and a comparative analysis of referenda-based con-
solidation efforts. Our comparative analysis systematically 
evaluates nine referenda-based consolidation attempts in relation 
to the Rosenbaum and Kammerer model. 
TALLAHASSEE CONSOLIDATION ATTEMPTS 
Tallahassee and Leon County, Florida have attempted 
consolidation at least six times (Mastron 1986). The most recent 
consolidation referendum was in 1992. In 1997, the issue was 
addressed again, but deemed "too hot to handle" (Dickens 1997, 
IA). Although the main issue in 1997 was whether to consoli-
date law enforcement departments, the subject of the city and 
county consolidation was also discussed . In this debate, Dickens 
(1997) noted that consolidation referenda in the county were de-
feated four times in the preceding 26 years. 
Tallahassee 1953. Most authors cite Tallahassee's con-
solidation attempts beginning in 1971. However, Tallahassee 
considered consolidation long before 1971. In September 1953, 
the Governor of Florida appointed a Consolidation Study Com-
mission (CSC) after an act of the Florida Legislature authorized 
the appointment (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 6). Future 
consolidation attempts are built on this first experience in what 
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Douglass North (1990) would describe as a path dependent proc-
ess. 
Population growth and land available for the city have 
been constant problems for the City. of Tallahassee. The CSC 
noted that 21 % of the population of Leon County (12,202 peo-
ple) lived in "the urban fringe" (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 
1955, 6). Service problems included sewage, street lighting, un-
paved streets, storm water drainage, land use planning , fire pro-
tection , traffic, and safety (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 8-
10). Possible solutions to these service problems included an-
nexation , a tactic that Tallahassee exercised frequently in its 
history . Nevertheless , annexation was not a viable answer in 
1953 since most properties were covered by homestead exemp-
tion and they had low assessed value. Consequently , incorpora-
tion or metropolitan tax districts were not acceptable solutions 
(Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 9-10). The county lacked 
funds to provide needed services to fringe areas. Contracting for 
the services was not considered because of expressed fears that, 
unlike water and sewage, setting prices for police and fire pro-
tection would be difficult or impossible (Jackson, Flannery, and 
Bair 1955, 10). 
The chapter of the CSC report on the reorganization of 
the law enforcement functions of the city and county provides a 
foreshadowing of future city and county law enforcement con-
solidation problems. The last sentence, set apart as its own para-
graph reads: "Neither the present chief of Tallahassee police nor 
the sheriff of Leon County see the need for or favor any form of 
consolidation" (Jackson, Flannery, and Bair 1955, 100). 
The final report recommendation of the CSC to the Gov-
ernor was not to consolidate several governmental department s 
at that time. Those departments were Law Enforcement, Road 
Construction , and Tax Assessment and Collection (Jackson, 
Flannery, and Bair 1955, 123). The commission did suggest that 
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the county court house and the city hall be in the same building 
or in adjacent buildings. These recommendations were never 
acted upon. 
Tallahassee 1973. Tallahassee held a consolidation ref-
erendum on November 2, 1971. The consolidation attempt failed 
with an unofficial tally of the vote, reported the next day, of 
14,740 against and 10,381 for consolidation (Sherer 1971). The 
pro-consolidation group argued that the vote was a rejection of 
the proposed charter and not a rejection of consolidated govern-
ment (Sherer 1971, 8). The 1973 attempt began early in 1972 
when the new mayor, James Ford, announced that the city com-
mission would open discussions of consolidation (Boyles 1972). 
Since the 1971 and 1973 efforts were separated by only five 
months, our analysis concentrates on the 1973 consolidation at-
tempt. 
Many of the advantages for consolidation were tied to 
the efficiency and economy of the consolidated government. 
Paul Craig , an economist at Florida State University , noted that 
the consolidation of police, fire protection , water and sewer, 
sanitation, and recreation could provide "economy of scale" 
benefi ts (Harbolt 1973). The difficult decision of how to select 
the chief law enforcement officer was decided through a straw 
poll of Leon County voters; the outcome favored an elected offi-
cial (Tallahassee Democrat 1972). 
Anti-consolidation forces were at work early in this con-
solidation effort, beginning with criticism of the way the con-
solidation charter was drafted. The anti-consolidation group 
requested the state attorney to investigate possible abuse of the 
Florida Sunshine Laws by the Charter Commission in drafting 
the charter (Jolley 1973b ). The group also claimed that the media 
was engaged in a conspiracy to assure that the consolidation 
passed (Jolley 1973a). 
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The public hearing on the consolidation charter, held on 
February 1, 1973, provides some insights into the heated battle 
and the issues underlying the consolidation debate. For three 
hours the debate continued. Fears raised in the session ranged 
from concern that the nonpartisan elections would signal the 
death of the Republican party in Leon County to questions as to 
whether consolidation , in general, was opposed or supported or 
whether the charter, in particular , was at issue (Spillan 1973). 
The advantages and disadvantages of consolidated gov-
ernment were debated by two local attorneys: Elliott Messer, 
chairman of Consolidation '7 3 and William Daniel , spokesman 
for Tallahassee-Leon County Action Committee Opposing Con-
solidation (Tallahassee Democrat 1973). The case for consolida-
tion was presented by Messer as an answer to governance and 
accountability problems created by fragmentation of local gov-
ernment: inadequate streets, inadequate mass transit , and storm 
water drainage problems . Daniels said that the current system of 
government was working and consolidation would create "big 
government" (Tallahassee Democrat 1973). 
Storm water drainage is cited often in the 1973 consoli-
dation debates along with concerns about how to choose the law 
enforcement chief. Consolidation was also linked to better law 
enforcement through the elimination of jurisdictional fragmenta-
tion, and by promoting the status and independence of the de-
partment (Carson 1973). 
The campaign for consolidation was heated. The pro-
consolidation side provided the city/county employees with fliers 
detailing the ways consolidation would save money through 
eliminating duplication and waste . The Consolidation News, a 
publication of the pro-consolidation group, noted the savings in 
tax dollars and the benefits of planning to relieve traffic jams, 
save Lake Jackson, and eliminate storm water run off. The News 
also strongly supported the idea that the consolidation would 
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The formation of the consolidation study con11mss10n 
demonstrates that the Stage II power deflator was present in 
Tallahassee . An accelerator event did not seem present. Civic 
elite demands for investigation of local officials and agencies 
and lawsuits , possible accelerators , did occur ; however, the in-
vestigation and lawsuit were threatened against the study com-
mission, and not against the city government. 
A professional campaign was waged on both sides and, 
in the end , the anti-consolidation campaign may have had more 
clout. Two characteristics of Messinger 's Professional Campaign 
Stage IV were apparent in the anti-consolidation campaign , but 
did not seem present in the pro-merger campaign. First, the anti-
consolidation group exploited the disadvantages of consolidation 
and, second, the anti-consolidation advocates targeted their cam-
paign to popular support or "grass-roots" members of the com-
munity (Messinger 1989). In this case, Rosenbaum and 
Kammerer's theory correctly predicted the outcome. 
Tallahassee 1992. Jack Schluckebier studied Tallahassee 
and Leon County 's 1992 consolidation attempt for his disserta-
tion in 1995. Schluckebier contends that Tallahassee, like 
Augusta and Athens , Georgia , did not have the presence of a 
Stage I Crisis Climate and therefore the Rosenbaum-Kammerer 
Theory does not work for Tallahassee. We believe Schlucke-
bier's rejection of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer framework 
was unwarranted. We show the applicability of the Rosenbaum 
and Kammerer theory through our analysis of the consolidation 
attempt drawn from local newspaper accounts. 
The public process of consolidation began late in Janu-
ary 1990 when the state representative supported by local busi-
ness executives , builders, and neighborhood associations 
introduced legislation in the Florida House of Representatives 
for the Tallahassee/Leon merger. The consolidation effort would 
require two votes from the public (Bruns 1990). The business 
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make government more responsive to the people and reduce tax 
inequities in the county (Consolidation '73 Committee 1973). At 
the polls on November 6, 1973, the voters defeated the consoli-
dation attempt by a vote of 12,665 against and 10,907 in favor . 
The defeat was blamed on low voter turnout (Harbolt 1973). 
Application of the Rosembaum-Kammerer Model to 
Tallahassee 1973. Our application of the Rosenbaum-Kammerer 
model to the 1973 Tallahassee case will first proceed following 
Messing er 's template. As Table 2 records, each phase of the cri-
sis climate was present. Drainage , street repairs, traffic jams , 
police protection were visible ongoing problems. Demand for 
governm ent response to these problems was present and had 
been for a long time. The response from the government was 
conservative . The city government tried to provide the services, 
but the effort was viewed as "too little too late." 
TABLE2 
Template Array for Tallahassee 1973 and 1992 
Crisis Power 
Location Climate Deflator Accelerator 
Stage I Stage II Stage III Merge? 
1 I 2 I 3 
Failed Reform With Referendum 
Tallahassee '73 X X X X NO 
Talla hassee '92 X X X X NO 
Notes: X = presence of the event or stage. 
• = Even or stage present only if theory modified . 
- = event or stage absent. 
Theory 
Predict 
Outcome? 
YES 
YES 
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community, developers, and neighborhood associations repre-
sented interests that supported consolidation. They acted as con-
solidation entrepreneurs. Their first step was to introduce a bill 
to form a consolidation committee by a popular vote; if the vote 
was successful, then the committee would draw up a charter to 
be presented to the Legislature and the citizens would vote on 
the charter (Fineout 1990b). The proposal for the formation of a 
charter committee passed by a margin of 57% to 43%. 
The choice of partisan versus nonpartisan elections was 
a contentious issue early in the process of forming the charter 
(Fineout 1991d). Partisan or nonpartisan elections were a source 
of contention in the consolidation debate from the early 1970s. 
Margaret Leonard (1991 b) noted that many aspects of the charter 
required compromises. The list of opposing points of the charter 
includes the following: an elected sheriff versus appointed sher-
iff, strong mayor versus weak mayor, an elected tax collector 
versus an appointed tax collector, one government versus saving 
jobs, utility revenue for the county versus Talquin Electric Co-
op, centralization versus decentralization of administrative serv-
ices. Leonard notes that for each point in the charter and each 
decision made by the commission, a new opposition group was 
mobilized (Leonard 1991b). 
The North Florida Chapter of the American Society for 
Public Administration recommended consolidation. The Chap-
ter's endorsement was based on five characteristics of the local 
area: homogenous demographics, the "blurring" of infrastructure 
responsibility due to increased growth and development, a de-
crease in the distinction between city and county service provi-
sion, adverse fiscal conditions for service provision in the county 
government, and increased problems of county service provision 
in :fragmented unincorporated county areas as future annexation 
occurred by the city (NFC of ASPA 1991, 1). 
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To satisfy the demands of neighborhoods, minority, and 
rural citizens, the commission chose a system of district repre-
sentation in which two of eight districts encompassed predomi-
nately black neighborhoods and one district encompassed 
primarily rural areas (Leonard 1991a). One small, rural, unincor-
porated community south of Tallahassee, Woodville, opposed a 
single rural district and an appointed sheriff (Fineout 1991c), a 
sentiment also expressed by citizens in Miccosukee, a small un-
incorporated community close to the Jefferson county line (Fine-
out 1991a). Miccosukee residents viewed their area as "a 
stepchild of Leon County" and believed that consolidation would 
cost more and provide fewer services (Fineout 1991a). However, 
a poll taken for the consolidation committee by the Oppenheim 
Research Group in October 1991 showed a 2 to 1 margin of sup-
port for consolidation in the county (Fineout 1991b). The survey 
of 861 Tallahassee citizens found that 48.1 % favored consolida-
tion, 26.4% opposed consolidation, and 25.6% were not sure 
(Oppenheim Research 1991, 19). 
In November 1991, a second element of a Stage II 
Power Deflation occurred. A grand jury was convened to inves-
tigate the departments of Law Enforcement in Tallahassee/Leon 
County and the consequences of consolidation (Peck 1991b). 
The grand jury investigation was an extension of an earlier in-
vestigation (Peck 1991c). The jury 's findings were that jurisdic-
tional competition, incompatible communication systems, and 
significant duplication of services between the Leon County 
Sheriff's Department and the Tallahassee Police Department cost 
taxpayers an extra $1.2 million annually (Tallahassee Democrat 
1991). The grand jury report stated that these deficiencies could 
be corrected through merger (Tallahassee Democrat 1991; Peck 
1991a). 
Schluckebier (1995, 142-143) did not categorize the 
grand jury report as either a failure of government or an accel-
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erator event since the grand jury took no action. Schluckebier 
states that convening the grand jury was simply one tactic em-
ployed by the pro-consolidation advocates in their campaign for 
the adoption of the charter. We agree with Schluckebier that the 
grand jury report was not an accelerator event, since the grand 
jury found waste and inefficiencies from competition, but not 
from fraud or illegal activities. Nevertheless, this finding clearly 
is a Stage II power deflation challenging the legitimacy of the 
exiting governance structure and empowering the pro-
consolidation efforts. 
With the campaign in full swing for both the pro- and 
anti-consolidation groups, two days before the referendum the 
"Opinion" section of the Tallahassee Democrat provided op-
posing viewpoints on consolidation (Tallahassee Democrat 
1992). A supporter of consolidation, Bernie Sliger, president of 
Florida State University, listed the advantages of consolidation as 
lower taxes and efficiency, a single law enforcement agency, ac-
countability, new jobs due to a friendly business environment, 
higher ethical standards in government, stronger growth man-
agement and environmental protection , better human services, 
and home rule. Opposition to consolidation cited the expense of 
big government and centralized control, lack of political ac-
countability resulting from fewer elected offices, politicized law 
enforcement, and greater inefficiencies (Tallahassee Democrat 
1992). 
The anti-consolidation efforts may have benefited from a 
paid political advertisement by Leon County Sheriff Eddie 
Boone that appeared in the Tallahassee Democrat two days be-
fore the referendum. Based on a 1991 manpower study, Boone 
claimed that 54 extra city police officers would be required to 
answer calls in the city that were currently answered by the 
county sheriff 's department. The additional officers would cost 
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the city more than $4 million the first year and almost $3 million 
each additional year. The advertisement ended with a statement 
that the sheriff 's department saved the taxpayers $1.7 million 
annually (Tallahassee Democrat 1992). 
On November 3, 1992, the voters of Leon County voted 
to reject the charter for consolidation by a margin of 3 to 2 
(Leonard 1992). Voters outside the city resoundingly rejected 
consolidation. In addition, despite the effort to draw minority 
districts , the African-American community opposed consolida-
tion fearing it would lose its voice in the governing process 
(Leonard 1992). 
Application of Rosenbaum-Kammerer Model to Tal-
lahassee 1992. In Tallahassee and Leon County, a crisis climate 
had existed for some time. The climate included rapid population 
growth and perceptions of lowered quality of services . Service 
problems were evident in discussions of the quality of services to 
rural areas and of monies needed by the county to provide those 
services. The law enforcement problem presented a political turf 
battle , but translated into a service problem in some areas. 
Population in Tallahassee continued to grow rapidly and pre-
sented ongoing environmental and service problems . The 1990 
reinstatement of the consolidation commission signaled a con-
tinuous question of whether the government was providing the 
services demanded by citizens and the presence of a power de-
flation stage. 
Civic and elite demand for investigations of local offi-
cials and agencies and the formation of local government study 
commissions or committees to explore government restructure 
were both present in the consolidation attempt. It is important to 
note here that Rosenbaum and Kammerer suggest that elites 
could be the " ... critical element in raising public disaffection 
with local government to the place where the public is receptive 
to consolidation" (Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974, 26). The 
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grand jury and the consolidation study commission are each 
characteristic of power deflation. The power deflation process 
described by Rosenbaum and Kammerer was clearly in place in 
Tallahassee. 
On the other hand, the accelerator was not present. There 
was no unifying emergency, scandal, or event. In fact, there ap-
pears to have been no unifying elements in the attempt at all. 
Two well-defined sides competed for diametrically opposed out-
comes with each side entrenched in the struggle. When posi-
tioned in Messinger 's Template in Table 2, the 1992 attempt 
appears to be like the 1973 effort. The actors and elements 
change, but the pattern is still the same. 
COMPARISON OF PATTERNS IN 
CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION REFERENDA 
The two Tallahassee consolidation attempts can be used 
to extend Messinger's research. The Template based on Mess-
inger is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 includes seven of Messinger 's sites. Unlike 
Messinger, we categorize Tampa as having the presence of a 
power deflator. Our categorization is based on our interpretation 
of Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's theory that the presence of a 
consolidation committee signaled a power deflator. The other 
difference between our model and Messinger 's model is the in-
terpretation of an accelerating event in Miami. Messinger did not 
think the acceleration stage was present in Miami. We interpret 
the corporate criticism of the government structure and services, 
and the scandal involving the county level government as a fo-
cusing and unifying stage for consolidation. Thus, the presence 
of an accelerator for Miami was added to our basic model. 
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A systematic application of the Rosenbaum and Kam-
merer theory proceeds by pattern matching the nine referenda 
attempts (the seven used by Messinger and the two Tallahassee 
attempts). We rely on the full Rosenbaum and Kammerer 
framework with the addition of Messinger's professional cam-
paign stage. Table 3 reveals a distinctive pattern match for city-
county consolidation attempts with a local referendum. The most 
TABLE3 
Consolidation Attempts Through Referenda With Presence or 
Absence of Professional Campaign (Stage IV) 
~ 
' i!. .;, =-"' 
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C: - ,g = .!: ~> .. .. 
 c:.I Q bl) =- 0 ··- -Location ..... ·- e:s CJ u bl) = : C. =.o .. - .. -
"' .. VJ - "' c!::! e = ., - ~ vi ·;:;;rJ'J 3:: .. e u vi ·;: 0 0 
-< u "" - "" 
I 2 3 Pro Anti 
Tallahassee '73 X X X X - X X 
Tallahassee '92 X X X X - X X 
Tampa X X - X - - X 
Nashville (1st) X X X X - - X 
Nashville (2nd) X X X X X X X 
Jacksonville X X X X X X -
Miami X X X X X X -
Lexington X X X X X X -
Virginia Beach X X X X X X -
Notes: X = presence of the event or stage. 
* = Even or stage present only if theory modified. 
- = event or stage absent. 
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obvious pattern in Tallahassee attempts in 1973 and 1992 is the 
lack of an accelerator in the reform process . Tallahassee did not 
appear to have any of the critical events or situations suggested 
by Rosenbaum and Kammerer that could throw the entire com-
munity into support of reform government. 
In each Tallahassee consolidation attempt , both the pro-
consolidation and the anti-consolidation groups ran professional 
campaigns. Nashville , in its second attempt , had campaigns that 
were both for and against consolidation. The outcome of the 
campaign reveals that a professional campaign is not as impor-
tant to success as a clear and definite accelerator. The result con-
firms Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's interpretation of Chalmers 
Johnson 's theory of revolutionary change. It also provides evi-
dence that although the extension of the Rosenbaum and Kam-
merer framework to include a professionally run campaign may 
illuminate the reasons for a consolidation attempt , the original 
model is robust in predicting radical change in local governance 
through referendum . 
Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's framework , thus , gives us 
not only those elements that are necessary for a successful at-
tempt at a consolidation, but also those elements that lead to fail-
ure. For consolidation entrepreneurs who view consol idation as a 
means to change the structure of the government or to dislodge 
the "old guard," this may come as a warning . Consolidation is a 
radical change in the way government is structured and functions 
(Marando 1979). If there is no overarching perception of true 
disinfatuation with the present government , the local citizens 
may opt for the status quo, believing perhaps that something 
other than complete restructuring of the government may solve 
the problem. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FuTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
Our study provides new insights into the application of 
Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's theory and revolutionary change in 
local governance . The extension of the case studies to include 
two of Tallahassee 's attempts at consolidation provides addi-
tional evidence supporting the original Rosenbaum and Kam-
merer model. 
Since city-county consolidation is a radical change in 
governance structures , community attachment and the modes of 
citizen problem solving can be critical. William Lyons and David 
Lowery (1986, 1989) identified four different responses that citi-
zens have when faced with governmental problems: the exit re-
sponse, leave and sever the relationship ; the voice response, 
actively participate to change the conditions ; the loyalty re-
sponse , wait for conditions to improve ; and the neglect response, 
withdrawal , alienation , and further distrust in the government. 
The response of citizens to a crises climate and power deflation 
are central to the reorganization process . Can citizens be mobi-
lized to support or oppose the consolidation effort? In Tallahas-
see, the voter survey reported three equally divided segments of 
the population : a pro-consolidation segment , an anti-
consolidation segment , and a segment that preferred to "wait and 
see." If the opposition can launch a strong campaign and the pro-
consolidation camp cannot mobilize grass roots support , even the 
support of the elites cannot guarantee success . For revolutionary 
change to occur, an accelerator must be present focusing atten-
tion on governance problems and mobilizing support for change. 
Our work suggests several ways that Rosenbaum and 
Kammerer 's theory could be expanded . Elements of internal 
threats and external threats to local areas need to be identified. 
One avenue for expansion of the model is consideration of the 
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role of consolidation entrepreneurs in city/county consolidation 
efforts. Under what conditions is the support of civic and other 
elites important? Does it matter which elites enter, initiate, and 
support the process? 
Consolidation entrepreneurs from different arenas can be 
important in the consolidation effort. Political , civic, and aca-
demic leadership can provide the stimulus to introduce the con-
solidation as an alternative in the reform effort in the power 
deflati on. Their support can also provide a sustaining catalyst 
throug h the acceleration and the driving force in a campaign. We 
need to identify community elites that act as consolidation entre-
prene urs and the interactions between these elite individuals and 
groups. Chalmers Johnson 's theory ofrevolutionary change and 
Rosenbaum and Kammerer 's extension of his approach to local 
government reform both stress the importance of the accelerating 
event. It is unclear whether these consolidation entrepreneurs on 
their own can create an accelerator. 
Another important question that could prove difficult to 
addres s was raised in a public hearing in Tallahassee in 1973: do 
voters support or oppose consolidation as a concept or is support 
or opposition based only on the proposed consolidation charter? 
If we take the approach of Steven Maser (1985 , 1998) that the 
muni cipal charter is a constitutional contract by the government 
with the citizens of the municipality, then we could explore the 
chang e of structure as an institutional change in the constitution. 
While this question has not been addressed, its answer may 
prove critical to our understanding of revolutionary change in 
metropolitan government. 
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